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1 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst gate revenue as a source of revenue for the (member-owned win-maximising) clubs in the 
Australian Football League (AFL) is relatively small and declining as a proportion, it is still an 
important source of revenue difference between clubs, and potentially their on-field playing 
performance. Until 2000, gate revenue was shared between the home and away teams (after the 
deduction of match expenses), after which the policy was changed to allow the home team to keep 
all of the (net) gate receipts. In the AFL, membership income, reserved seat and corporate box 
income has never been shared, but the league does share the revenue from key income streams 
such as national TV broadcast rights (there is no local TV revenue), corporate sponsorship and 
finals.  
 
The AFL (1998) recommended in its Gate Sharing Discussion Paper to change the gate-sharing 
arrangements, because the intended equalising of gate revenue was not being achieved. Whilst 
net gate proceeds had traditionally been shared 50-50, membership and reserved seat income had 
not. This meant that a club playing in a large stadium with a large cash-paying crowd provided a 
good return for the visiting side. However, a club playing in a small stadium filled mostly with 
members and reserved seat holders had little room for a cash-paying crowd, and hence provided a 
poor return to the visiting team. According to the AFL, teams based at larger stadiums were (net) 
contributors, whereas teams based in small stadia were (net) beneficiaries, and these revenue 
redistributions were not always having the intended effect of equalising gate revenue. Moreover, a 
club’s net financial position would be affected by the fixture, in particular, the mix of its home 
games which were ‘fixtured’ at large and small stadia, the number of interstate games and the 
number of ‘blockbuster’ games (those games ‘fixtured’ between large-drawing teams twice each 
season so as to maximise attendance). 
 
The AFL concluded that allowing the home team to keep the whole of the net gate would 
‘paradoxically’ create more equalised outcomes, and recommended the abolition of gate sharing. 
From 2000, the AFL allowed the home team to keep 100 percent of the (net) gate, arguing that this 
would encourage clubs to move to large stadia to play in front of large crowds rather than play in 
small stadia filled mostly with members. The AFL also recommended a doubling of the equalisation 
levy (a levy on all match goers paid into a central fund and distributed equally amongst the clubs), 
to help compensate clubs for the ‘unfairness’ in the fixture because all teams do not play each 
  2other twice.
1 The clubs rejected the doubling of the equalisation levy, but it was agreed that the 
‘equalisation levy’ be adjusted for ‘football’ inflation, and the ‘blockbuster levy’ of A$25,000 be 
retained. 
 
Following these changes, clubs have responded in several ways. One change was predicted by 
the AFL and has seen clubs move either all or some (high-attendance) home games to bigger 
stadia to maximise attendance and (net) revenue. Another change, perhaps unforeseen, has seen 
some Victorian-based clubs, often against the wishes of their respective football departments, 
concede their home ground advantage and move low-attendance home games interstate. Finally, 
more clubs now want to be involved in ‘blockbuster games’ which are fixtured for public holidays 
such as Anzac Day and the Queen’s Birthday holiday, by hosting their own clashes with traditional 
rivals. 
 
2  EARLY HISTORY OF GATE-REVENUE SHARING 
According to the AFL's (1998, p.1) Gate Sharing Discussion Paper: 
The AFL … has for longer than anyone can remember, shared the gate proceeds. The 
reasons were, we presume, something to do with equalisation. The practice started before 
there were two full rounds fixtured and sharing the VFL gates would have compensated for 
the effects of the draw.
2
It is generally thought that up until the end of World War II that the home team kept the net gate 
receipts (gross gate receipts less match expenses). Moreover, it would appear that from 1945 the 
AFL (1996, p.49) adopted what it describes as a 'modified form of pooling of gate receipts'. 
Presumably, this means that gate receipts were split between the home and away teams after the 
deduction of match expenses, a practice that was maintained until the end of the 1999 season. 
 
According to the AFL (1996), in 1973 a surcharge on finals' tickets was introduced for the 
establishment of a Ground Improvement Fund. The following year the surcharge was applied to 
cash admissions to home and away matches and continued until it was replaced in 1983 with a 
larger surcharge for a newly created VFL Club Development Fund. 
 
In addition to this, according to the AFL (1996), from 1981 an equalisation levy was charged 
against all cash paying spectators, paid into an equalisation fund and then redistributed equally 
amongst all clubs. Likewise, it appears that at least from 1982, a contribution from each adult club 
                                                  
1 Since 1995, the AFL has comprised 16 teams and has played a fixture of 22 games. 
2 Two full rounds (22 games) for 12 teams were not played until 1970. 
  3membership ticket was made to the VFL Club Membership ticket pool. In 1986 the Club 
Development Fund was incorporated into the VFL Equalisation Fund.
3
 
3  GATE REVENUE SHARING ABOLISHED 
An AFL (1998) Gate Sharing Discussion Paper concludes that though the intention of gate sharing 
was to equalise, in some cases it had largely the opposite effect. Whilst gate proceeds have 
traditionally been shared, generally speaking clubs have kept their own home membership and 
reserved seat income. This meant that a club that played in a large stadium with a large cash-
paying crowd provided a good return for the visiting side. However, a club that played in a small 
stadium filled mostly with members and reserved seat holders had little room for a cash-paying 
crowd, and hence provided a poor return to the visiting team.
4 Moreover, the practice of deducting 
match costs from the gate meant that only with a large cash-paying crowd were there any 
proceeds left to share with the visiting club. In other words, according to the AFL (1998), home 
members were not paying for their share of match expenses. 
 
According to the AFL (1998), this 'home member' bias explained why it was generally the MCG 
and Waverley Park-based teams who were (net) contributors, whereas West Coast, Adelaide and 
Carlton were (net) beneficiaries. Collingwood's position varied depending on the mix of 
MCG/Victoria Park games. Melbourne-based clubs received little when travelling interstate, but 
likewise, interstate teams suffered when they played at Princes Park or Victoria Park. These 
financial outcomes were highly influenced by the fixture of matches in any year. Another anomaly 
was that Fremantle, playing at the same venues as West Coast, was a net contributor, whereas 
West Coast was a beneficiary. 
 
The AFL (1998) concludes that allowing the home team to keep the whole gate would 
'paradoxically' create more equalised outcomes. It recommended the abolition of gate sharing and 
a doubling of the equalisation levy from 2000, with the home club to keep the whole gate but be 
responsible for match expenses. The rationale for this recommendation was that this would leave 
the degree of equalisation of the same order of magnitude, since both the levy and gate sharing 
redistributed about $4 million each in 1997. Furthermore, according to the AFL (1998), the doubling 
of the levy would help to compensate clubs for the 'unfairness' in the fixture because teams do not 
play each other twice, an issue which becomes more important if the home team keeps the whole 
                                                  
3 See AFL (1996, p.52). 
4 Gleeson (2000) reports that Sydney, Brisbane and West Coast also own the corporate boxes at their 
grounds, which earns these clubs millions of dollars, and also suggests that Sydney, as the non-Melbourne 
club with the biggest crowds in Melbourne, is the club that has been worst affected. 
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games being scheduled twice because of the traditional crowd-drawing power of these teams. 
Finally, allowing the home team to keep the whole gate would increase the incentives for clubs to 
play in large stadia with larger cash crowds rather than in small stadia filled mostly with members. 
In the middle of 1999 the AFL announced that from 2000 gate sharing would be abolished and the 
home team would pay all of the match costs from its gate receipts but would not have to share the 
net gate receipts with the visiting team. The AFL (2000) reported that most of the eight clubs who 
provided feedback to the Gate Sharing Discussion Paper rejected the idea of doubling the 
equalisation levy. It was decided to increase the cash payer and home club member equalisation 
levies (a levy on all match goers paid into a central fund and distributed equally amongst the clubs) 
in line with football inflation from $1.20 and $1.10 respectively to $1.50. The ‘blockbuster levy’ (a 
levy on ‘blockbuster games’ between large-drawing clubs scheduled twice each season so as to 
maximise attendance) was retained and adjusted for 'football' inflation to $25,000, with the 
expectation of future adjustment for football inflation. 
 
4  MOVEMENT OF ‘HOME’ GAMES 
 
This paper will discuss two of the major economic effects of the abolition of 50-50 gate revenue 
sharing from 2000 (after deduction of match costs) in favour of the home team keeping the net 
gate, but will ignore the effect of changes to the equalisation levy. The first change was predicted 
by the AFL and has seen clubs move (all or some) home games to bigger stadia to maximise 
attendance and (net) revenue. A second change is that some clubs, often against the wishes of 
their respective football departments, have conceded their home ground advantage and moved 
low-attended home games to interstate venues (sometimes to venues in the so-called ‘non-football’ 
states of New South Wales and Queensland). This is designed to increase net revenue through a 
combination of increased attendance and thereby gate revenue and/or lower venue costs, but also 
to increase ‘exposure’ in other markets and potentially grow fan support and thereby membership 
and membership revenue. 
 
4.1 Overview 
Table 1 shows the location of AFL home and away matches by venue from 1995 to 2005 which 
allows us to identify some of the major shifts in the location of AFL matches, especially since 2000, 
the first year of the policy change.  
  5Table 2 shows the city in which various stadia are located and their capacity (in 2005). Some 
preliminary comments are necessary to explain some of the influences (other than the change in 
gate sharing arrangements) on the location of games, but which are not the main focus of this 
paper. 
The first thing to note is that the increase in the number of games played at Football Park in 
Adelaide (which was already the home ground of the Adelaide Crows who joined the AFL in 1991), 
from 11 until 1996 to 22 from 1997 as a result of the inclusion of the expansion team Port Adelaide 
in 1997. 
 
Another key feature is the closure of Waverley Park at the end of 1999 (capacity 72,000), an AFL-
owned stadium built in the 1970s in the outer south eastern suburbs of Melbourne, and the 
opening in 2000 of the smaller (capacity 53,355) modern Docklands stadium (with a retractable 
roof) close to Melbourne’s dockland precinct next to the CBD. AFL annual reports tell us that in 
1999, 21 matches were played at Waverley Park with an average attendance of 33,558. Docklands 
Stadium hosted 48 games in 2000 with an average attendance of 30,524. Whilst the capacity of 
Waverley Park was 72,000, the record crowd was 92,935 set on the Queens Birthday weekend in 
1981 for a match between Hawthorn and Collingwood. 
 
The Waverley Park closure/Docklands opening also coincided with a reduction in the number of 
games played at the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG), the venue for the 1956 Olympic Games. 
The record attendance for the MCG is 121,696 for the 1970 Grand Final between Carlton and 
Collingwood, but owing to safety considerations, standing room was phased out in favour of more 
seating which reduced the capacity to around 100,000. The stadium is currently being redeveloped 
in time for the 2006 Commonwealth Games during which the capacity will vary between 70,000 
and 80,000, with a capacity on completion of again around 100,000. The number of matches 
played at the MCG reduced from 58 in 1999 (with an average attendance of 42,370) to 42 in 2000 
(with a higher average attendance of 46,141). 
 
The MCG currently has four home tenants: Collingwood, Hawthorn, Melbourne and Richmond. 
Docklands Stadium has four home tenants: Essendon, the Kangaroos, St Kilda and the Western 
Bulldogs. Carlton is splitting its home games between the MCG and Docklands from 2005 (see  
  6Table 3), whilst the other Victorian club (Geelong) is based at Kardinia Park in Geelong, about 
75km south west of Melbourne. Sydney plays most of its games at the Sydney Cricket Ground 
(SCG) and Brisbane plays its home games at the Gabba, so named because it is located in the 
inner southern Brisbane suburb of Woolloongabba. 
 
The Western Australian Cricket Association (WACA) ground in Perth hosted six matches (three 
home games each of Fremantle and West Coast) from 1995 (the year of Fremantle’s entry to the 
AFL), whilst the other eight home matches of each club were scheduled for Subiaco Oval. From 
2001 all home matches of the West Coast and Fremantle have been played at Subiaco Oval. 
The Whitten Oval in the inner west of Melbourne ceased being an AFL venue at the end of 1996, 
the last year in the competition of Fitzroy who merged with Brisbane to become the Brisbane Lions 
in 1997. The Western Bulldogs played just one home game (its last) at its traditional suburban 
home ground in 1997 before moving the majority of its home games to Princes Park from 1997 to 
1999, until becoming a tenant at the new Docklands stadium in 2000. 
 
Most of the other changes in Table 1 will be discussed in the following section. In essence, the 
response of some clubs to the change in the gate-sharing arrangements was to move permanently 
to a larger venue or move matches with high attendance to larger venues, and move matches will 
low attendance to interstate venues. 
 
4.2  Permanent Move of Home Games to Larger Stadia 
4.2.1  Carlton move to the MCG and Docklands 
Table 1 shows the decline in the total number of games hosted at Princes Park from 18 in 1995 to 
only one (for a farewell game for Carlton) in 2005. In 1999, 16 matches were fixtured at Princes 
Park, Carlton’s traditional home ground with an average attendance of 21,586. In 2000, there were 
only 9 matches played there for an average attendance of 24,656. 
 
 
  7Table 3 shows the venues for Carlton home games between 1999 and 2006. In 1999, Carlton 
played eight of its 11 home games at Princes Park and the other three at the MCG against 
Collingwood, Richmond and Essendon, three of the best-supported clubs in Melbourne. The other 
eight games played at Princes Park in 1999 were 8 Western Bulldogs home games, the Bulldogs 
playing their other three home games at the MCG against Richmond, Kangaroos and Adelaide. 
The following year in 2000, The Bulldogs played none of their home games at Princes Park, 
instead choosing as their new home ground the newly-completed Docklands Stadium where they 
played 10 games, with the other ‘home’ game moved to the SCG against Sydney. 
 
The major change in the location in Carlton home games occurred in 2005, after the Future Home 
Games Sub-Committee of the Carlton Football Club Limited (2004) recommended in a paper to its 
members, Information regarding Future Home Games: A Recommendation by the Board of the 
Carlton Football Club to members regarding the playing venue of future home games, that 10 of 
the eleven 2005 home games be played at either the MCG (four) and Docklands (six), and one 
‘farewell’ game at Princes Park, and that from 2006 until 2014, Carlton regularly play five home 
games at the MCG and 6 at Docklands. 
 
In the recommendation to Carlton members, it is clear that a number of financial considerations 
were paramount. Independent financial analysis undertaken for Carlton estimated that relocating 
home games to the MCG and Docklands would generate a financial return of $22-26m over 10 
years compared with around $14m at Princes Park. The paper also points out that Carlton’s 
membership remained static between 1996 and 2002, whereas both Essendon and Collingwood 
experienced huge increases in membership after moving their home games to the MCG and 
Docklands. Moreover, home games which Carlton had already played at the two larger capacity 
stadiums had attracted average crowds larger than the 32,000 capacity of Princes Park. Indeed 
from 2002 until round 17 of 2004, average attendances at Carlton home games at the MCG were 
51,396, at Docklands 34,173 and at Princes Park 21,379. An additional consideration, was that 
free-to-air (FTA) television coverage of home games at Princes Park was the lowest of any team in 
Melbourne, and the expectation of more FTA coverage of games from the MCG and Docklands 
would likely have a positive influence on Australia-wide support and hence membership and 
sponsorship. In summary, increased membership, corporate support, sponsorship and match day 
returns were the financial influences driving the decision by Carlton to leave Princes Park. 
 
4.2.2  Collingwood Leaves Victoria Park 
In 1999, Collingwood played two home matches at Victoria Park, with an average attendance of 
21,967. This was the last year AFL football was played at Victoria Park, with Collingwood playing 7 
home games at the MCG and 4 at Docklands in 2000. 
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4.3  Moving High-Attendance Home Matches to Larger Stadia 
4.3.1  Sydney to Stadium Australia 
Since 2002, the Sydney Swans have played three home games at Stadium Australia, (formerly 
known as the Olympic Stadium), located at Homebush, a suburb west of the Sydney CBD, which 
hosted the 2000 Olympic Games. As shown in  
  9Table 2, the capacity of the reconfigured Stadium Australia is now only 80,000, but nearly twice the 
capacity of Sydney’s regular home venue, the SCG, which has a capacity of just over 43,000. 
Table 4 shows the attendance at Sydney’s home games against Essendon, which averaged 
30,187 between 1995 and 2001 at the SCG (excluding 1998 when this match was not fixtured), 
compared with an average of 48,829 for the three matches at Stadium Australia from 2002 to 
2004, that is, on average over 18,000 more fans. 
 
4.3.2  Geelong to Docklands Stadium 
Geelong moved some of its home games from the smaller-capacity Kardinia Park (28,300) in 
Geelong to the larger-capacity Docklands Stadium (53,355) in Melbourne. From 1997 until 1999, 
nine home matches were played at Kardinia Park, which was reduced to seven in 2000 and 2001, 
and increased to eight matches between 2002 and 2005. 
 
Geelong is faced with a trade off, that of moving games to a larger venue (in the city of Melbourne, 
an hour’s drive from regional Geelong) where more fans (including Melbourne-based Geelong 
fans) can be accommodated but where the (net) venue revenues are lower. At Geelong’s 
traditional home ground of Kardinia Park in Geelong, venue revenues from reserved seating, 
signage, coterie groups and the social club more than offset the higher match returns from the 
larger crowd at Docklands stadium in Melbourne; thereby make the economics of playing at the 
smaller venue attractive. In Geelong’s 2006 fixture request to the AFL, Brian Cook (CEO of 
Geelong FC) calculates that Geelong would make a net profit of $508,000 at Kardinia Park with a 
crowd of 26,000 compared with a net profit of $283,000 at Docklands Stadium with a crowd of 
42,000. 
 
4.4  Victorian clubs Moving Low-Attendance Home Matches Interstate 
The hope of this strategy is that it both increases attendance and lowers venue costs, and also 
increases membership and corporate support, enough to offset the displeasures of the football 
department, who concede home-ground advantage, and existing members who are denied an 
opportunity to watch their team. 
 
4.4.1  Kangaroos to Sydney and Canberra 
All of the games shown in Table 1 played at the 14,000-capacity Manuka Oval in Canberra were 
Kangaroos home games. The club began with one game in 1998, none in 1999 and 2000, then 
from 2001 three each season (except for 2003 when only two were played). In 2001, the three 
matches at Manuka Oval averaged 11,368, in 2002 the average crowd was 9,509, in 2003 (for the 
two matches) the average was 12,043 and in 2004 the average crowd was 10,218. 
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The Kangaroos have also experimented with the Sydney market, playing their home game against 
Sydney at the SCG from 1999 to 2002, and thereafter in Canberra. The four-year experiment in 
Sydney averaged crowds of 21,110 compared with an average in Canberra of 14,361 over the two 
years 2003 and 2004. 
 
It would appear that other forces could be driving this experiment, possibly including the higher 
fixed venue costs of operating the SCG which almost certainly would require a larger crowd to 
break even financially. Another clue is provided by Main (2005), who reports that while the 
Kangaroos estimated that they had just 400 members in the ACT in 2003, membership has grown 
to around 1600 in 2005 and is expected to grow to about 2000 in 2006. 
 
4.4.2  Western Bulldogs to Sydney and Darwin 
Since 2000, the Western Bulldogs have played their ‘home’ game against Sydney at the SCG in a 
deal which, according to Lane (2005), is revised annually.  
  11Table 6 shows the venue and location of Western Bulldogs’ home games against Sydney since 
1995. The average attendance at the SCG for the five games between 2000 and 2004 is 21,569, 
much healthier than the 1997 attendance of 12,604 at Princes Park in Melbourne. 
The Bulldogs played one game at Marrara Oval in Darwin in 2004 with an attendance of 13,271 
and are committed to another game in 2005 and 2006 under a three-year deal. Stevens (2005) 
reports that the Bulldogs CEO, Campbell Rose, indicates that the two interstate home games 
commitment nets the club about $500,000 a season, and is essential to prevent the club from 
making (bigger) losses. 
 
4.4.3 Melbourne  to  Brisbane 
 
 
Table 7 shows details of Melbourne home games against Brisbane, which were played in 
Melbourne until 2000, but at the Gabba (in the suburb of Woolloongabba) in Brisbane from 2001. 
The increase in average attendance is significant, with the five games in Melbourne 1995-2001 
(excluding 1996) averaging 17,256, and the four games in Brisbane 2001-2004 averaging a 
healthy 27,861 and trending upwards. However, it should be borne in mind that Brisbane was a 
very successful team during the four year period 2001-2004. 
 
4.4.4  Hawthorn and St Kilda to Launceston 
Hawthorn first played a home game at York Park in Launceston, Tasmania in 2001, and since then 
has played two home games at that venue against non-Victorian teams.  
  12Table 8 shows the location, attendance and venue of Hawthorn’s home games against Fremantle 
since 1995. Average crowd size in Launceston for the three games 2002-2004 (15,610) compares 
not unfavourably with average crowd size at Docklands in 2000 and 2001 (16,299), and with venue 
costs probably much lower in Launceston than at Docklands, plus the likelihood of increasing 
memberships in Tasmania, makes the Tasmanian experiment potentially rewarding financially for 
Hawthorn. 
 
According to Stubbs (2005), St Kilda is believed to benefit by around $300,000 from staging a 
home match in Launceston. The Saints began playing two home matches at York Park in 2003 and 
have a deal which expires in 2007. Despite some recent misgivings from the football department, 
this is probably another example of a strategy designed not only to increase attendance and 
thereby gate revenue, but also to increase ‘exposure’ in other markets and potentially grow fan 
support and corporate and membership revenue. 
 
5  ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GATE-SHARING CHANGES 
Following recent articles by Szymanski (2003), Szymanski (2004), Szymanski and Késenne (2004) 
and Késenne (2005), the author is aware of the conjecture about the appropriateness of the Quirk 
and Fort (1992)/Fort and Quirk (1995) two-team league model to, among other things, analyse the 
impact of different revenue sharing schemes in different leagues. For example, Késenne (2005, 
p.105) states: 
The impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance is complicated because it depends 
on many factors such as the objectives of clubs, the specification of the revenue functions, 
the specific sharing arrangement in operation, and the supply of talent. Moreover, some 
results based on a simple 2-team model do not apply to a general n-team model. 
The question is whether it is still appropriate to use the two-team league model to analyse and 
illustrate the impact of this change to the gate sharing arrangement in the AFL, when the league is 
comprised of member-owned win-maximising clubs and the supply of talent is fixed (there is only 




Figure 1  Total Revenue Functions in a Two-Team League 
                                                  
5 See Booth (2004a, 2005 forthcoming) for more detail on the win-maximising nature of AFL clubs. 





Késenne (1996, 2000, and 2001) showed that gate sharing in general leads to greater 
competitive balance in a league comprised of win-maximising clubs, whilst Késenne (2005), using 
an n-team model, concludes that pool revenue sharing also improves competitive balance if clubs 
are win maximisers. Késenne (1996 and 2001) illustrated the effect of gate sharing upon 
competitive balance in a 2-team model, but Késenne’s (2000) analysis was in terms of an n-team 
model, but without any diagrammatic illustration. The analysis by Booth (2000) of the effect on 
competitive balance in the AFL of 50-50 gate sharing was in terms of a 2-team league model, and 
examined the impact on total (and average) revenues of a strong-drawing team and a weak-
drawing team, team i and team j respectively, shown in  
 
Figure 1. Implicitly, this analysis was in terms of net gate receipts. A strong-drawing team 
was thought of as typically having big attendances at home and therefore large gross gate 
receipts. In such cases, even after deducting match costs (a large element of which would be 
fixed) net gate receipts would still be relatively large so that the practice of gate sharing 
redistributed revenue from the strong-drawing team to weak-drawing team and thereby improved 
the level of competitive balance. Likewise, the presumption was that typically a weak-drawing team 
played in front of small home crowds and after the deduction of match costs had only a relatively 
small value of net gate receipts to be shared with the visiting team. 
 
Booth’s (2000) analysis showed that under win maximisation, gate sharing moves the league 
towards more competitive balance as the home team’s share of the gate decreases, but without 
any effect on player salaries. As shown in 
  14Figure 2, and summarised in Booth (2004b), the effect of gate sharing (at the free agency 
outcome) to decrease the average revenue (per unit of talent) of strong teams and increase the 
average revenue (per unit of talent) of weak teams which tends to equalise the teams ability to 
acquire talent. If the only revenue were from the gate, and it was shared 50−50, both teams would 
have equal ability to acquire player talent. Moreover, since the teams are win maximisers and 
aggregate total revenue is assumed to be unchanged, player salaries do not change. 
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5.1  How abolition of gate-sharing improves revenue equality 
Assuming it is still appropriate to analyse the effect of gate sharing (in a league of win-maximising 
clubs and a fixed supply of talent) using a 2-team league model, the analysis above needs to be 
adjusted so as to more accurately capture the impact of a so-called strong-drawing team playing at 
home in a relatively small stadium filled mostly with members, such as at Subiaco (West Coast), 
Football Park (Adelaide) and Princes Park (Carlton). Because receipts from club memberships and 
reserved seat purchases were not shared with the visiting club, this meant that the number of cash 
paying spectators was relatively low and once the match costs were deducted there was even less 
to be shared with the visiting club. Under such circumstances, much of the attendance revenue 
from these strong-drawing teams was effectively quarantined and the revenue left to be shared 
was more akin to the revenue of a so-called weak-drawing team in terms of our analysis. In terms 
of our diagrammatic representation, in effect, the total revenue functions would be reversed, that is, 
what appeared to be the team with the highest total (gate) revenue actually had little (net) gate 
revenue to be shared. In, other words, the so-called strong-drawing team playing in the small 
stadia had the revenue function, say, of team j, and the so-called weak-drawing team playing in a 
typical stadium had the revenue function, say, of team i. The result is that with 50-50 gate sharing 
shown  in 
  16Figure 2 the effect is to increase the playing talent and win percent of team j (the strong-drawing 
team) at the expense of team i (the weak-drawing team), leading to 50-50 gate sharing making the 
revenues of the two teams more unequal and thereby lessening competitive balance. 
Note that this anomaly does not apply to the same extent to strong-drawing teams that played in 
large stadia, such as the MCG or Waverley Park. Even though the strong-drawing teams may have 
had a large number of members and reserved seat holders whose revenue was not shared, 
because of the large capacity of large stadia there would still have been a significant number of 
cash paying spectators. Therefore, there would still have been significant revenue from the gate 
(after deduction of match costs) to be shared with the visiting team. 
 
5.2  Move to larger stadia or interstate venues increases revenue significantly 
The permanent move to larger stadia, the movement of high-attendance games to large stadia and 
the move of low-attendance games interstate (to lower cost venues), all have the intended effect of 
increasing the total (net) revenue (after the deduction of match costs) to the home team, that is 
increasing the total and average revenue functions in  
 
Figure 1 and 
  17Figure 2. Even with gate sharing in operation, revenue would be expected to increase with these 
changes, but with the home team keeping all of the (net) gate increases, that is, conferring no net 
benefit to the visiting team, the value (and therefore the incentive) associated with making changes 
to home venues is much greater, and is more likely to offset the displeasure of the club’s football 
department who have to concede home ground advantage, and club members who are able to 
watch fewer ‘home’ matches. 
 
6  CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The evidence provided in this paper suggests that there have been three main responses by AFL 
clubs to the change from 50-50 sharing of the net gate, to the home team keeping the net gate 
from season 2000. 
 
The first change identified is the permanent move of a club of its home venue from a small stadium 
to a large stadium, such as Carlton from Princes Park to a combination of the MCG and Docklands 
from 2005, and Collingwood ceasing to play its last remaining games at its traditional suburban 
home of Victoria Park in 1999. It would appear that the driving force of these changes is the 
expectation of a larger attendance at the larger venue, more than enough to offset the possibly 
higher venue costs. In addition, other economic benefits to flow could be increased membership, 
free-to-air television coverage and increased sponsorship. 
 
The second change identified is the moving of high-attendance home games to larger stadia, such 
as Sydney moving three games from the SCG to Stadium Australia from 2002, and Geelong 
moving some home games to Docklands stadium in Melbourne beginning in 2000. The same 
economic forces appear to be driving this shift, but in addition, a possible financial advantage might 
arise from catering for a different set of fans which the club hopes will more than offset any upset 
of its football department or local members/supporters. 
The third change identified is the moving of low-attendance home games to interstate 
venues. The Kangaroos experimented with the Sydney market playing their home game against 
Sydney at the SCG from 1999 to 2002, and since then in Canberra where three Kangaroos home 
matches have been played since 2001. The Western Bulldogs have transferred their home game 
against Sydney to the SCG since 2000, and in 2004 and 2005 have played one home game in 
Darwin. Melbourne has played its home game against Brisbane at the Gabba since 2000, and has 
experienced a significant increase in attendance over time. Both Hawthorn and St Kilda have 
transferred home games to Launceston in Tasmania; Hawthorn beginning with one in 2001, and 
two thereafter, whilst St Kilda began playing two home matches in Launceston in 2003. Even if 
these matches do not attract much of a larger attendance, lower venue costs might be an 
attraction, as well as the potential for increasing membership and corporate support in another 
  18market. Any loss imposed on members and fans who miss home games and the wrath of the 
football department playing away from home, must also be considered. 
 
In terms of further research, analysis of gate receipts or other match day data (possibly to be 
provided by the AFL), would help to identify more precisely the financial and other economic 
effects on individual clubs at different venues. For example, the finances of the Docklands stadium 
need further investigation. In the annual report of the Footscray Football Club Limited (2005), now 
trading as the Western Bulldogs, the CEO Campbell Rose discusses the budgetary pressures the 
high fixed costs of Docklands Stadium created for the club. Rose says it cost the club about 
$100,000 to play at its home ground in 2003. However, the club has now negotiated with 
Melbourne Stadiums Limited, the owners of Docklands stadium, an improved return for its home 
games at Docklands based on a ‘fixed’ match return arrangement. This means that rather than 
being dependent on crowd numbers for a cash positive return on home games played at 
Docklands, the club now has guaranteed revenue, regardless of the size of the crowd. Rose 
estimates that this represents a turnaround of several hundred thousand dollars. 
 
There may be other moves of home games which have escaped the author’s attention in this 
paper. For example, there may be economic reasons associated with the change in gate sharing 
arrangements which explain of the demise of the use of the WACA ground in Perth as a venue for 
some home games of the West Coast and Fremantle from 2001. Finally, more analysis of the 
finances of the so-called ‘blockbuster games’ is required, including the importance of the $25,000 
blockbuster levy. The desire of more clubs to share in these games suggest that they are unhappy 
for the rewards of these blockbuster games go to the ‘big four’ Melbourne clubs, Essendon, 
Collingwood, Richmond and Carlton. 
  19Table 1: AFL Games by Venue, 1995-2005 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
11 11 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22  Football Park 
11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12  Gabba 
18 17 22 17 16 9  9  10 8  7  1  Princes Park 
50 51 53 55 58 42 44 42 41 41 42  MCG 
     48  43  42  45  44  49  Docklands 
10  10  9 9 9 7 7 8 8 8 8  Kardinia Park 
11 11 11 11 15 15 13 10 9  9  9  SCG 
       3  3  3  3  Stadium Australia 
16 16 16 16 16 16 22 22 22 22 22  Subiaco 
   1    3  3  2  3  3  Manuka 
      1  2  4  4  4  York Park 
         1   1   Marrara 
6 6 6 6 6 6           WACA 
3 4 3 2 2             Victoria Park  
24 24 22 26 21             Waverley Park 
15  15  1           Whitten Oval  
1              Bruce Stadium 
176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176  Total 
 
  20Table 2: Stadium Capacity, City Size, AFL Venues, 2005 
 
Stadium Capacity City  Population 
Football Park  51515 Adelaide  1,200,000 
Gabba  37500 Brisbane  1,500,000 
Princes Park  32000 Melbourne  4,000,000 
MCG  80000 Melbourne  4,000,000 
Docklands  53355 Melbourne  4,000,000 
Kardinia Park  28300 Geelong  200,000 
SCG  43386 Sydney  4,250,000 
Stadium Australia 80000 Sydney  4,250,000 
Subiaco  42885 Perth  1,200,000 
Manuka  14000 Canberra  400,000 
York Park  25000 Launceston 100,000 
Marrara  15000 Darwin  100,000 
WACA  22000 Perth  1,200,000 
Victoria Park  27000 Melbourne  4,000,000 
Waverley Park  72000 Melbourne  4,000,000 
Whitten Oval  25000 Melbourne  4,000,000 
Bruce Stadium  24647 Canberra  400,000 
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  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Princes Park  8 9 9 4 8 7 1  
MCG  3 2 2 3 2 2 4 5 
Docklands        4 1 2 6 6 




Table 4: Sydney Home Games v Essendon, 1995-2004 
 Round  Day  Session  Venue  Attendance 
1995  13 Sunday  Early  SCG  21853 
1996  6 Friday  Night  SCG 22088 
1997  15 Sunday  Early  SCG 36077 
1998  Not fixtured        
1999  18 Saturday  Night  SCG 31776 
2000  14 Sunday  Day  SCG  29199 
2001  4 Friday  Night  SCG  40131 
2002  9 Saturday Night  Stadium  Australia  54129 
2003  11 Saturday Night  Stadium  Australia  45917 
2004  21 Saturday  Night  Stadium  Australia  46440 
 
Table 5: Kangaroos Home Game Attendance v Sydney, 1995-2004 
 Round Day  Session  Venue Attendance 
1995  15 Saturday  Day  MCG  22524 
1996  11 Saturday  Day  Princes Park  18644 
1997  Not fixtured        
1998  8 Saturday  Day  MCG 43400 
1999  19 Saturday  Night  SCG  27964 
2000  5 Sunday  Day  SCG  19306 
2001  3 Saturday  Night  SCG  22395 
2002  19 Saturday  Night  SCG  14776 
2003  9 Sunday  Early  Manuka  13832 
2004  4 Sunday  Early  Manuka  14891 
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 Round  Day Session  Venue  Attendance 
1995  1 Sunday  Day  Whitten  Oval  19189 
1996  Not fixtured        
1997  2 Saturday  Day  Princes Park  12604 
1998  20 Saturday  Day  Waverley Park  32577 
1999  Not fixtured        
2000  10 Sunday  Day  SCG  18817 
2001  8 Sunday  Day  SCG 22874 
2002  8 Sunday  Early  SCG 20934 
2003  12 Saturday  Night  SCG  21742 
2004 10  Saturday  Night  SCG  23479 
 
 
Table 7: Melbourne Home Game Attendance v Brisbane, 1995-2004 
 Round Day  Session  Venue  Attendance 
1995  7 Sunday  Day    MCG  12783 
1996  Not fixtured        
1997  12 Sunday  Day  MCG 13392 
1998  18 Saturday  Day  MCG 16518 
1999  21 Saturday  Day  MCG 18679 
2000  10 Monday  Night  Docklands  24908 
2001  12 Sunday  Day  Gabba  23740 
2002  14 Sunday  Early  Gabba  25166 
2003  10 Saturday  Night  Gabba  29634 
2004  10 Sunday  Early    Gabba  32902 
 
  23Table 8: Hawthorn Home Game Attendance v Fremantle, 1995-2004 
 Round Day  Session  Venue  Attendance 
1995  15 Saturday  Day  Waverley  Park  14167 
1996  Not fixtured        
1997  17 Saturday  Day  Waverley Park  15939 
1998  22 Saturday  Day  Waverley Park  39735 
1999  18 Sunday  Day  Waverley Park  13941 
2000  12 Saturday  Night  Docklands  16004 
2001  18 Saturday  Day  Docklands  16595 
2002  3 Sunday  Early  York  Park  15066 
2003  13 Sunday  Early  York  Park  17212 
8 Sunday  Early  York  Park  14554  2004 
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